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Quiet diplomacy  
The reasons behind Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policy 
Martin Adelmann 
Abstract 
South Africa’s policy of quiet diplomacy towards Mugabe has been se-
verely criticised by the West and within South Africa alike. As South Africa 
is regarded as the key external player in the Zimbabwe crisis, calls for a U-
turn in South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy are mounting. This paper explores 
the underlying reasons for South Africa’s policy of quiet diplomacy. It ar-
gues, in opposition to the general opinion, that quiet diplomacy is neither 
exceptional nor based on ideological blood chains, but rather follows the 
tradition and goals of South African foreign policy. Despite failure to bring 
about a solution to the crisis, quiet diplomacy is portrayed as South Af-
rica’s best option, as it minimises the potential risk of a deeper crisis. Thus, 
external calls on President Mbeki to change his Zimbabwe policy are in 
vain.     
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Introduction: the Zimbabwe crisis  
ver the last four years, Zimbabwe has become a synonym for bad govern-
ance. Shaken by two interwoven crises, Zimbabwe, once the granary and 
hope of Africa, is rapidly deteriorating: economically, the country is on the brink 
of starvation; politically, the leadership of President Mugabe has lost its popular 
support and legitimacy. 
 Zimbabwe’s economic crisis started long before the country became a 
focus of African politics. All through the 1990s the Zimbabwean economy did 
not experience sufficient growth, despite a relatively favourable resource base. 
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Macroeconomic mismanagement and a corrupt clientelistic system precluded 
economic growth from within. The awakening economic giant South Africa 
strangled Zimbabwe from the outside. IMF and Worldbank programmes were 
not able to restart the Zimbabwean economy, but instead increased the debt, 
leading to further economic decline. In November 1997, the Zimbabwean econ-
omy collapsed, with the currency loosing 74% of its value in a single day.1  
 The economic downturn stimulated the rise of a political opposition 
movement: the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by trade unionist 
Morgan Tsvangirai. The opposition won a first victory over the governing 
ZANU-PF party when the new constitution, which was intended to extend 
President Mugabe’s powers, was rejected in a referendum in 1999. A defeat of 
the ruling party in the upcoming parliamentary (2000) and presidential (2002) 
elections was in sight. As Mugabe’s resource base was considerably weakened, 
he was no longer able to mobilize political support in his neo-patrimonial system 
of governance. Not prepared to accept defeat, Mugabe gradually turned to un-
democratic, illegal and increasingly violent means to preserve power. In the eyes 
of Western observers, the 2000 and 2002 elections were not free and fair. But as 
the mere harassment of the opposition was not enough to sustain support, Mug-
abe drew upon his last resort: the race card. With the help of the “war veterans”, 
he started a land reform program aimed at reallocating land owned by white 
farmers to black peasants. The attempt to solve the “colonial problem” did not 
only increase his support from the rural poor, who hoped for economic empow-
erment, but also from parts of the ruling class, who managed to acquire a sub-
stantial number of farms. Undoubtedly, the violent land reform and the break-
down of democracy and of the rule of law exacerbated the economic and politi-
cal crisis. Today, after four years in limbo, “Great Zimbabwe” lies in ruins.  
Europe’s reaction to the crisis: smart sanctions 
The way in which a once prospering democracy was ruined within a few 
years caused an uproar in the Western world. Unlike many other cases, where 
Western media and politicians turned their backs on just another failed Afri-
can democracy, the EU, led by Britain, took an active stance on the crisis. The 
attention Zimbabwe receives can be explained by the strong historical and 
personal ties between Britain and the former settler colony, as well as by the 
country’s good media coverage from neighbouring South Africa, which 
serves as an African hub for Western correspondents and news-agencies. In 
                                                 
1 For a critical evaluation of Zimbabwe’s economic policy see: Bond and Manyanya (2003).  
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addition, the crisis peaked at a time when the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) initiative and the post 9/11 debate on international 
terrorism had put failing African states back on the global agenda. As a result 
of this awareness, Europe could not turn a blind eye to Zimbabwe. 
 The EU’s reaction to the crisis was strongly influenced by the para-
digm of good governance. The Cotonou agreement between the EU and the 
ACP countries proclaims that political and economic governance conditions 
are prerequisites for development aid and trade privileges.2 When the crisis in 
Zimbabwe mounted, the expectations of the European public, together with 
the need to stick to the rules set in the Cotonou agreement, left the EU hardly 
any choice: Zimbabwe became the test case for the good governance ap-
proach. After the failure of constructive dialogue in terms of Art. 96 of the 
Cotonou framework, followed by an attempted but abortive election observa-
tion mission in 2002, the EU finally applied “smart sanctions”: a travel ban 
and a freeze of overseas assets were imposed on the inner circle of the Mug-
abe regime.3 In addition, Zimbabwe’s Commonwealth membership was sus-
pended. By breaking ties with Mugabe, the EU has clearly occupied the moral 
high ground. But as the alleged “dictator” withstands the sanctions of the 
alleged “racist imperialists”, “loud diplomacy” has ended in a deadlock situa-
tion. Even worse, Mugabe’s anti-colonial agitation skilfully drove a wedge 
between EU members and damaged EU-SADC and EU-ACP relations 
(Weiland 2003).  
Criticism of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy approach  
Despite, and because of, the apparent failure of their own response to the 
crisis, the Western world increasingly turned their attention to South Africa. 
As the direct neighbour, regional leader and Zimbabwe’s major trading part-
ner, it was strongly felt that South African peer pressure was the key to the 
crisis. But unlike the Western world, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki 
has not applied sanctions against Zimbabwe, but has instead chosen a strat-
egy of quiet diplomacy and constructive engagement (see below).  
                                                 
2 The IMF, the Worldbank and the US AGOA initiative have also attached good governance 
conditions to development aid. In addition to the EU’s focus on good governance, some 
European states, foremost the UK under New Labour, have programmatically shifted from 
an interest-based approach towards a more ethical, idealistic foreign policy towards the 
South. Compare: Abrahamsen and Williams (2002).   
3 The EU insists that smart sanctions, unlike economic sanctions, are not directed against the 
people. However, because the Washington Institutions and the majority of Western coun-
tries also withheld development funds and denied Zimbabwe trade privileges, they added 
to the decline of Zimbabwe’s economy and hence to the suffering of the people. 
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In Europe and South Africa, this approach soon attracted high attention and 
widespread criticism. On the one hand, international leaders such as George 
W. Bush and Gerhard Schroeder appreciated (during their visits to South 
Africa) Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy, because it kept open a channel of communi-
cation between Mugabe and the outside world. On the other hand, the policy 
was criticised as being too soft on Mugabe and inconsistent with Mbeki’s own 
democratic ideals (e.g. Taylor 2002). Hussein Salomon’s comment in The Star 
(2003) that “he [Mbeki] is not prepared to stand by the principles he is espous-
ing in terms of Nepad and a vision on an African renaissance”, is typical in 
this regard. In addition, an acceptance of the deteriorating situation seemed to 
be against South Africa’s own best interest of installing peace and democracy 
in the region. As Mbeki’s diplomatic efforts failed to bring about a quick solu-
tion, quiet diplomacy was finally criticised as fruitless and counter-productive 
to Western sanctions. With these arguments at hand, politicians, the media 
and scientific journals called on Mbeki to give up his “passiveness” towards 
Zimbabwe. Besides paternalistic advice and suggestions for alternative poli-
cies, European governments were called upon to massively step up pressure 
and to play hardball (“Tacheles reden”) with Mbeki in order to achieve a 
change in South Africa’s foreign policy. (Deutscher Bundestag 2003, Ziemen 
2003: 18, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2004).  
 As the South African government was unfazed by the criticism, 
speculations about the reasons behind quiet diplomacy began to circulate. The 
first cluster of arguments evolved around the line that Mbeki’s quiet diplo-
macy was just a fig-leave for his support of Mugabe – silent diplomacy as 
silent approval. In a strong version of this argument, the ANC is accused of 
ideologically supporting Mugabe’s undemocratic policies as a future model 
for South Africa. This criticism falls in line with similar arguments that the 
ANC’s pledge to democracy and good governance is only lip service. In the 
words of opposition leader Tony Leon (2003): “[T]he ANC is not really inter-
ested in reform in Zimbabwe, or in democracy, or in human rights”. State-
ments by Mbeki and some of his ministers in support of the controversial land 
reform are quoted to back up this argument. But the thesis that Mbeki is just 
another Mugabe is obviously just political propaganda. Nontobeko Hlela 
(2002: 137) comments: “The Democratic Party of South Africa, especially, has 
exploited the Zimbabwe issue for political gain, using this issue to incite 
South African citizens and to attempt to discredit Mbeki’s government by 
playing on the fears of its white constituents.” Mbeki has repeatedly reaf-
firmed that in South Africa the land issue will be solved within a legal frame-
work, and so far the country shows no signs of going the Zimbabwean way.  
 A second, weaker version of the support thesis claims that Mbeki is 
bound to Mugabe by history. Statements by ANC’s chief whip Tony Yengeni 
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(2001) that “the ANC has historic links with Zanu PF – they fought the same 
liberation struggle against colonialism and racism” and by the head of the 
ANC’s international affairs division Mavivi Myokayaka-Manzini (quoted in 
Mail and Guardian 2001) that “these [ZANU and ZAPU] are our comrades we 
fought with in the struggle ... Our relations have been sealed in blood”, are 
seen as evidence for historical ties between the two governments. Tony Leon’s 
(2003) criticism that, “[t]he ANC’s unswerving loyalty to its fellow liberation 
government has undermined any claim ... as to the even-handedness of its 
approach”, plays on the alleged historical bias. While it is true that the ANC 
has spent more time talking to ZANU-PF than to MDC, the claim of the ANC 
(Yengeni 2001) that “we speak to all parties in Zimbabwe, including MDC” is 
also empirically valid. Looking at recent history, it becomes clear that the 
“blood chains” between the respective governments are rather weak. In fact, 
both countries are regional rivals, and the personal ties between their leaders 
are characterised by animosity rather than friendship.  
 A second strain of arguments concerns the thesis that Mbeki is not 
ahead of his own policies and misjudges the situation. Paternalistic statements 
aimed at reminding Mbeki of the seriousness of the problem (and the conse-
quences of the current policy for South Africa) sometimes seem to be based on 
a perception that Mbeki has not yet realised the magnitude of the problem, an 
accusation that stands in sharp contrast to the numerous diplomatic initiatives 
South Africa has taken in the past. More serious are claims that Mbeki mis-
judges the situation. They carry some weight, as they come from a prominent 
source: Moeletsi Mbeki, businessman, political analyst and brother of the 
President (2004):  
The ANC knows very little about Zimbabwe [...] you have those dynam-
ics, which our government in South Africa, frankly, has no idea about. 
They don’t know who Morgan Tsvangirai is. They don’t know who Pat-
rick Chinamasa is. They don’t know who Welshman Ncube is. But they 
think they know. [...] It is not enough to have an ideology that makes 
you feel good or that is seen to be the right ideology. That doesn’t solve 
the problem. You have to have real knowledge of the situation. We 
don’t know enough about Zanu-PF and [don’t] understand what the 
land issues, for example, in Zimbabwe are.  
The argument that Mbeki does not know what he is doing is often accompa-
nied by references to Mbeki’s controversial HIV/AIDS policies, in order to 
show that ideology, stubbornness and misinformation, not rationality, govern 
South African policy-making. But the misinformation thesis is hard to accept 
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in the light of the lively public debate and the numerous information sources 
in the country.4 
 None of the arguments explored above can sufficiently explain why 
South Africa sticks to its Zimbabwe policy despite mounting internal and 
external criticism. Instead of shedding light on the underlying reasons for the 
South African approach, the public debate is characterised by exactly what it 
charges Mbeki with: a lack of factual information and a high level of politici-
sation. In order to gain a deeper understanding of South Africa’s Zimbabwe 
policy, the article henceforth describes the various shades and turns of South 
Africa’s position and analyses the merits of this approach in the light of the 
overall framework of South Africa’s Foreign Policy.  
The changing face of quiet diplomacy 
South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy has become known by the catchphrase “quiet 
diplomacy”. The term describes two things: The overall framework is diplo-
macy, rather than sanctions or military action, while the adjective “quiet” 
refers to the style of the diplomatic engagement. In opposition to Woodrow 
Wilson’s (1918) doctrine that “diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in 
the public view”, the ANC believes that “diplomacy is always quiet” (Victor 
Mditshwa quoted in IRIN  2004). Thus it prefers behind-the-scenes negotia-
tions to public statements. The absence of the public potentially increases the 
chance of finding a diplomatic solution. However, the lack of valid informa-
tion has not only nurtured speculation about what really happens behind 
closed doors, but also led to a situation where the focus of attention has 
moved from the content to the procedure of foreign policy. Thus it was 
widely overlooked that under the unchanged framework of quiet diplomacy, 
the aims and the tone of South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy have considerably 
shifted over time.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Besides the government related channels (Department of Foreign Affairs, National Intelli-
gence Agency, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, ANC’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs), academic institutions (SAIIA, ISS, AISA, ISS, IGD), numerous NGOs and 
the media have provided substantial  information on the crisis.  
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History of the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
South Africa and Zimbabwe are connected by a joint settler-colony history of 
minority rule and liberation struggle, which still impacts on both countries’ 
politics and economies today. However, the timeframes of liberation differed 
substantially. South Africa achieved independence already in 1910, but major-
ity rule was only reached in 1994, after decades of Apartheid. In Zimbabwe, 
the Empire ruled until 1964, and majority rule was achieved in 1980. Thus, 
although both countries suffer from the same legacy, they only met as equals 
ten years ago. Previously, Zimbabwe was in the front line of the struggle 
against Apartheid; it suffered from South Africa’s destabilisation policy and 
responded with political opposition and diplomatic non-recognition of the 
Apartheid government. But as Zimbabwe was economically dependent on its 
southern neighbour, it could not cut all ties. It needed South African harbours 
as well as preferential trade access to the Apartheid state.5  
 During the South African transition period (1990-94), political rela-
tions normalised, peaking in full diplomatic recognition and integration of 
South Africa into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
after majority rule was achieved. However, despite the end of Apartheid, the 
former enemy did not become a new friend. Instead, for Zimbabwe, the New 
South Africa remained the “bully” in the south, a challenger against which 
Zimbabwe was unable to compete. The new imbalance was most visible in the 
economic field. Trade between the two countries rapidly increased during the 
1990s, but it did so hugely to South Africa’s advantage, since its superior in-
dustry swiftly pushed into the Zimbabwean market. During the 1990s, the 
trade balance shifted from roughly 1:2 to almost 1:7 in South Africa’s favour 
(Table 1). While both countries in principle welcomed economic exchange, 
they were also eager to protect their respective industries. Already in 1992 
South Africa decided not to renew the 1964 preferential trade agreement, 
which translated into a tripling of tariffs for goods from Zimbabwe. Especially 
the Zimbabwean textile industry was severely hurt. As a response to rapid 
de-industrialisation, Zimbabwe imposed a 100% tariff in 1999. The looming 
trade war came to an end with the introduction of a quota system in 1999 and 
the signing of the regional SADC Free Trade Agreement by South Africa in 
2000. The negotiation of the latter was again a reflection of the parties’ diverg-
ing economic interests. Besides successfully competing on the Zimbabwean 
market, South Africa also harmed its northern neighbour’s economy indi-
rectly: its rapidly rising share in the African and world market was partly at 
                                                 
5 The colonial transport routes were re-emphasised through South Africa’s destabilisation 
policy against the Beira corridor. A trade agreement existed since 1964 and remained in force 
on Zimbabwe’s request after 1980. 
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Zimbabwe’s expense. Zimbabwe might also have seen a higher inflow of 
Foreign Direct Investment if South Africa had not emerged as a more lucra-
tive investment destination after 1994.6 In addition, the Zimbabwean economy 
suffered from a constant brain drain to South Africa. Thus the Zimbabwean 
economic crisis of the 1990s was to some extent South African-made, though 
unintentionally so.    
 
Table 1: South African – Zimbabwe Trade (in ‘000 SA Rand, based on 2000)  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Imports to South Africa 1386 1103 1551 1391 980 1096 1286 1304 1295 1369 1851
Exports from South
Africa
3021 3061 3800 6014 6518 6421 6062 5580 4865 5131 6300
Import/export ratio 2,2 2,8 2,5 4,3 6,7 5,9 4,7 4,3 3,8 3,7 3,4
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (2004a). 
 
While economic competition strained the bilateral relationship heavily, politi-
cal  differences between Mugabe and Mandela further poisoned the relation-
ship. The leaders of the liberation movements, bound together by the com-
mon struggle, are often portrayed as allies in an “old boys’ network”. How-
ever, within this network the link between the ANC and ZANU was rather 
weak, even before 1994. ZANU was traditionally allied with the PAC (and 
Beijing), while the ANC was supported by SAPU (and Moscow). Unsurpris-
                                                 
6 South Africa absorbs about 85% of the regional FDI. 
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ingly, the ANC’s headquarters in exile, where Thabo Mbeki spent consider-
able time, was based not in Harare, but in Lusaka.  
 With the disappearance of the common enemy, relations soured, 
because the old (Zimbabwe) and the new (South Africa) regional leaders soon 
found themselves in a struggle for political dominance. Initially, the regional 
organisation SADC had found a compromise between the two powers by 
naming Mandela SADC chairman and Mugabe, who was the last chairman of 
the now defunct Front Line States group, chairman of the newly established 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). However, just one 
year later, at the Malawi Summit (1997), both statesmen clashed over the role 
of the OPDS, and its chairman. Mugabe was unwilling to pass on the chair-
manship. He also denied any responsibility to report to the SADC Summit, 
because he saw the OPDS as an independent organisation. While the first was 
a clear violation of SADC rules, the latter had not been clarified at the time. 
Nelson Mandela as SADC chairman demanded the subordination of Mugabe 
and the OPDS to the SADC structure and even threatened to step down as 
SADC chairman if Mugabe did not change his course. As no agreement could 
be reached, South Africa finally declared the OPDS as illegitimate, and it be-
came de facto defunct.  
 But the struggle for SADC leadership had not yet ended: In 1998 
Zimbabwe, supported by Angola and Namibia, intervened militarily in the 
DRC to back the government of embattled Laurent Kabila (and to exploit the 
country’s resources). Mugabe, in his capacity as (illegitimate) OPDS chair, 
justified the intervention as a SADC action, although no formal Summit deci-
sion had been taken. Mandela made it clear that South Africa preferred a 
negotiated solution to the DRC war and demanded the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces. In both cases, the political differences were not kept behind 
closed doors. Mandela instead publicly criticised Mugabe (and still does so 
today), a very rare occasion in African politics and an indication of the diplo-
matic rift between the two countries. 
 But the conflict between both countries also had a personal component. 
With the re-appearance of Mandela on the international stage, Mugabe, who 
was hitherto the most senior regional leader, found himself sidelined over-
night. The charming Mandela and the intellectual Mbeki achieved an interna-
tional status that Mugabe could only dream of. The personal setback was 
probably harder to take than the economic and political decline of Zimbabwe. 
Chris Landsberg (2002: 177) concludes that “[b]y the end of Mandela’s term in 
office relations between him and Mugabe were frosty, and there was a virtual 
“cold war” between Pretoria and Harare”. Thus when Mbeki took over the 
Presidency in 1999, the relationship between both countries was no longer 
dominated by “blood chains”, but rather, as Martin Rupiya (2003: 161) argues, 
by “brinkmanship and frustration”. The tightening of visa controls and the 
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erection of an electric fence at the common border symbolises the erosion of 
post-Apartheid bilateral relations.   
 When Mbeki came to power in 1999, the improvement of the bilateral 
relations was a key priority of his presidency, which was marked by the idea 
of an “African Renaissance”. Ever since his inauguration, Mbeki tried to es-
tablish a better working relationship with Mugabe.7 A policy of quiet diplo-
macy, rather than public criticism, became the new political style. But Mbeki’s 
quiet diplomacy should not be misunderstood as new friendship or quiet 
support,  but must rather be seen as a constructive engagement strategy with 
clear aims. Within the unchanged framework of quiet diplomacy, at least 
three phases with different aims can be distinguished:  
First phase: support for the land reform 
In a first phase of the crisis, from 1997 to 2000, South Africa’s Zimbabwe pol-
icy was dominated by constructive engagement and support for a solution of 
the “colonial problem”. The bottom line of South Africa’s position was that 
the “key to the solution of the problems faced by Zimbabwe is the speedy 
resolution of the land question” (Yengeni 2001). Mbeki repeatedly called on 
Great Britain and other donors to contribute funds for a peaceful land reform 
on the basis of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement.8 At a conference in Ha-
rare in 1998, donors agreed in principle to pay for a land reform. In spring 
2000 Mbeki brokered another land reform package, which was to be funded 
by the UK, the IMF, Saudi-Arabia and other donors (Baumhögger 2000: 436; 
Sunday Times 2000). A few months later, the SADC mandated President 
Thabo Mbeki (and President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi) with a new initiative to 
approach the UK for a land reform. This time, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan and UNDP’s Mark Malloch Brown were also involved in the negotia-
tions (van Wyk 2002: 108). But despite successful behind-the-scenes diplo-
macy, none of the agreements materialized. The program’s lack of transpar-
                                                 
7 Mugabe was a special guest at the inauguration ceremony and Zimbabwe received the 
honour of being chosen to play South Africa in a friendly soccer game on inauguration day 
in honour of the new president.    
8 The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement settled the independence of Zimbabwe. Britain 
agreed to finance a land reform on a willing-buyer willing-seller basis, but payments were 
stopped in 1988 because Britain did not agree with the way in which land was being redis-
tributed. Mbeki has drawn attention to the UK’s financial responsibility for the land reform 
on numerous occasions, for example, at the 2000 G77 Summit in Cuba, the State of the Na-
tion Address 04.05.2000, the SADC Summit at Victoria Falls 21.04.2000, and the SADC Sum-
mit in Windhoek 06./07.08.2000. 
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ency, as well as the ongoing violence and continuing illegal farm seizures 
undermined all constructive efforts.   
As the illegal farm seizures in Zimbabwe prohibited an orderly land reform 
and set a dangerous example for South Africa,9 Mbeki began to stress the 
importance of non-violence and the rule of law. He reaffirmed several times 
that the South African land reform would proceed only within the constitu-
tional framework, and publicly criticised the violence and the mishandling of 
the land reform in Zimbabwe: “It is important that the violence in that coun-
try must end, that the conflict around the land issue must end, that the up-
coming [2000] elections should be free and fair and that the land question 
must be addressed in a manner which is beneficial to all Zimbabweans, with-
out confrontation, without conflict” (Mbeki quoted in Stiff 2000: 437).10 But 
Mbeki – unlike other prominent South Africans – did not openly attack Mug-
abe. Instead, the diplomatic approach continued with bilateral meetings be-
tween heads of state and at ministerial and party level, in addition to multi-
lateral meetings. Mbeki’s handshakes with Mugabe and his continuing sup-
port for the land reform were harshly criticised in South Africa and abroad, as 
they were interpreted as approval of Mugabe’s policies. However, the diplo-
matic efforts were aimed at moderating between the Zimbabwean parties and 
at positively influencing Mugabe to conduct the land reform in a legal way. In 
accordance with the constructive engagement policy, South Africa, together 
with other SADC countries, also spoke out strongly against sanctions on Zim-
babwe, because sanctions were not consistent with a non-confrontational 
diplomatic style and because diplomatic support for Zimbabwe was neces-
sary to keep up the South African influence on Zimbabwe.  
 Besides diplomatic endorsement, South Africa also started a number 
of initiatives to prevent the complete breakdown of the Zimbabwean econ-
omy. On 14 February 2000, a US $133 million  “rescue package” for Zimbabwe 
was announced, which allowed Zimbabwe to keep up its electricity and oil 
supply (IRIN 2000). Part of the money went directly back into the pockets of 
South African parastatals Eskom and Sasol, which are among Zimbabwe’s 
major suppliers. Peter Stiff (2000: 414/415) speculates that the loan was sub-
ject  to certain conditions, such as the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from 
DRC, compliance with IMF conditions, and a change in the leadership of Zim-
babwe’s Oil (Noczim) and Electricity (Zesa) companies. Today Zimbabwe is 
deeply indebted to South Africa, but despite a lack of payment, South African 
                                                 
9 South Africa’s own land reform program, based on the willing buyer – willing seller prin-
ciple, proceeds very slowly. Landless South Africans have staged demonstrations, and there 
have been a few incidences of illegal Zimbabwe-style farm seizures in South Africa.  
10 Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2002: 104) counted that, before 2000, Mbeki spoke out against violence 
in Zimbabwe six times in speeches held elsewhere, in addition to two occasions in Zim-
babwe itself. 
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can parastatals continue their supplies to Zimbabwe to keep the economy of 
the northern neighbour afloat. In addition to its own financial support, South 
Africa also tried to convince the IMF to resume aid to Zimbabwe.  
 Looking back at the first stage of the crisis, it must be concluded that 
Mbeki had a consistent policy on Zimbabwe. In order to achieve a peaceful 
land reform and to avoid a deepening of the crisis, South Africa offered to 
moderate between the Zimbabwean parties, as well as between the Zimbab-
wean government and donors. In addition, Mbeki threw Mugabe several 
economic and diplomatic lifelines. But despite these efforts, the situation dete-
riorated further in 2000, because Mugabe did not keep his promise to ensure 
non-violence and a law-based land reform in return for South African sup-
port. If Mbeki is to be criticized for mismanaging the crisis, it must be for not 
initially realizing that not land, but Mugabe’s declining power was the real 
reason for the crisis, as Tendai Dembetshena wrote in 2002 (quoted in Hussein 
2002: 152): 
“Right from the onset South Africa’s reaction to the farm invasions and 
political violence was fatally flawed because it swallowed the line that 
land was the root of the crisis. President Mbeki genuinely believed that 
if he could persuade the British to fund the land programme, the crisis 
would end ... But the problem was that Mugabe was unwilling to meet 
the conditions set by the British and other donors because they threat-
ened his political agenda.” 
 
Second phase: Criticism of violence and regional diplomacy 
 
When Mbeki realized that the most pressing problem was the breakdown of 
the rule of law, he changed his stance. In a BBC interview on 5 August 2000 he 
admitted his mistake and announced a tougher line on Mugabe (Osmanovic 
2001: 423). Just a week later the new policy of crisis containment through 
amplified regional diplomacy became imminent. The SADC put Zimbabwe 
on the agenda and mandated a task force of six states (Namibia, Malawi, An-
gola, South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique) to deal with the problem. The 
task force travelled to Harare on 10-12 September, where they demanded 
from Mugabe an end to the farm seizures. They also met opposition leader 
Tsvangirai and civil society groups. The SADC Summit in Blantyre (12.-
14.08.2001) also discussed the Zimbabwe issue and, according to Mbeki 
(2001a), agreed unanimously that “Zimbabwe ... must remain a democracy in 
all respects, including the observance of the rule of law, as well as ensuring 
the independence of such institutions as the judiciary and the press.” At the 
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extra-ordinary summit in Blantyre (14.01.2002), the SADC reiterated its de-
mand for democracy in Zimbabwe. In a diplomatic formulation (“Summit 
welcomes the following actions to be undertaken by Zimbabwe”) SADC de-
manded  
· “full respect for human rights, including the right to freedom of opinion, 
association and peaceful assembly for all individuals;  
· the commitment to investigate fully and impartially all cases of alleged 
political violence in 2001, and action to do so ;  
· a Zimbabwean Electoral Supervisory Commission which is adequately 
resourced and able to operate independently, the accreditation and regis-
tration of national independent monitors in good time for the elections; 
· a timely invitation to, and accreditation of, a wide range of international 
election observers; commitment to freedom of expression as guaranteed by 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe;  
· reaffirmation by Zimbabwe of its practice of allowing national and inter-
national journalists to cover important national events, including elections, 
on the basis of its laws and regulations;  
· commitment by the government of Zimbabwe to the independence of 
the judiciary and to the rule of law; and 
· the transfer by the Government of Zimbabwe of occupiers of non-
designated farms to legally acquired land.”11   
Parallel to the SADC initiative, the Commonwealth agreed in Abudja 
(06.09.2001) on (the old formula of) a UK-financed land reform in return for 
an end to farm violence. Compared to the year before, the focus had changed. 
At the SADC Victoria Falls Summit (21.04. 2000), the solidarity with Mugabe 
and the support for the land reform were stronger than the concerns over the 
mishandling of the reform. Now, Mugabe was still diplomatically backed – 
the sanctions policy of the West might have contributed to the African 
solidarity – however, the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe had taken 
precedence over the “colonial issue”. Especially Botswana and South Africa, 
which were most severely affected by the crisis and which see themselves as 
the custodians of democratic values in the region, pressed Mugabe to put his 
house in order. But again the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts 
failed, because Mugabe did not live up to his promise to end violence in Zim-
babwe. As the showdown of the upcoming presidential election left no room 
for compromises, quiet diplomacy was continued in the hope that “the after-
                                                 
11 The SADC issues two communiqués, a lengthy internal communiqué and a shorter one 
for the public. Public communiqués are normally very uncritical and unspecific. The critical 
remarks in the public communiqué on Zimbabwe were therefore remarkable. Besides the 
points listed above, the SADC also expressed “serious concern” over a statement by the 
Zimbabwean military on the elections. 
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math [of the elections] would provide space for dialogue and democratic 
reform” (Buthelezi 2002).  
However, the presidential elections (09.-11.03.2002) did not bring about a 
solution, but rather reinforced the political deadlock. Mugabe was the official 
winner, but a strong opposition claimed – justifiably - that the election was  
neither free nor fair. Zimbabwe was on the brink of civil war. South Africa’s 
answer to this situation was again containment and diplomacy: Mugabe was 
recognized as elected President, and a diplomatic initiative was started (to-
gether with Nigeria) to broker a government of national unity in Zimbabwe. 
South Africa managed to bring both parties, represented by Ncube (MDC) 
and Chinamasa (ZANU-PF), to the negotiation table; however the talks soon 
broke down, as both parties were unwilling to compromise. Mbeki’s diplo-
matic approach had once again suffered a severe setback.  
Third phase: search for a post-Mugabe government of national unity 
Nevertheless, even after the breakdown of the talks, South Africa stuck to its 
policy of quiet diplomacy. In order to break the deadlock in Zimbabwe, a 
two-pronged policy was now put in place: Mediation between the parties in 
order to bring them back to the negotiation table, and work towards a post-
Mugabe Zimbabwe. Both parties in Zimbabwe attached conditions to further 
negotiations: ZANU-PF demanded that the election result, and hence the 
legitimacy of Mugabe’s presidency, be acknowledged; the MDC insisted on 
new elections and  on the withdrawal of treason charges against Tsvangirai. 
Since neither party was prepared to fulfil the other’s conditions, formal talks 
have so far not been resumed. However, there are rumours about ongoing 
informal talks, which were nurtured by the South African government on the 
occasion of the visits of US President Bush and German Chancellor Schroeder 
to South Africa (Africa Confidential 2003). The immediate denial of ongoing 
talks by Mugabe and Tsvangirai is no surprise, as they can hardly admit to 
ongoing talks while officially challenging each other in court. As quiet diplo-
macy is confidential by nature, it remains unclear at what stage the “talks 
about talks” are. Mbeki has set both parties a deadline to resume formal nego-
tiations by June 2004.  
 While South Africa and the SADC keep defending the Zimbabwe 
government in international fora such as the UN, Commonwealth or ACP 
against Western sanctions, often with strong anti-colonial rhetoric, internally 
Mugabe seems to have lost the support of fellow leaders and is perceived by 
the majority as being part of the problem. Despite a previous agreement to the 
contrary, Mugabe was denied the SADC Vice-Chairmanship tat the Luanda 
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Summit (2.-3.10.2002) – a position which would have automatically propelled 
him to the SADC leadership a year later. Even though Mbeki repeatedly 
stated that he would not actively intervene in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs, as 
“the people of Zimbabwe must decide their own future”, he still facilitated 
behind-the-scenes talks for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. In December 2002, 
Emmerson Mnagagwa, one of Mugabe’s possible successors, was invited to 
the ANC party congress in Stellenbosch. In January 2003, negotiations for a 
Mugabe exit scheme, brokered by the retired Colonel Lionel Dyck, with the 
support of South Africa and the UK, apparently reached an advanced stage. 
According to the plan, Mugabe would have been granted immunity or offered 
asylum in Malaysia, where he was vacationing at the time. Simultaneously, a 
government of national unity was to be established, and the UK would have 
financed a legal land reform. However, due to infighting in ZANU-PF, the 
plan was leaked to the press before completion, and the potential successor 
Mnagagwa was considerably damaged (Africa Confidential 2003, Möllers 
2003a). Despite this failure, Mbeki kept working behind the scenes towards a 
transitional government in Zimbabwe. Diplomatic activity continued in 
spring 2003 with a visit by the Troika Mbeki - Obasonjo - Muluzi (5 May), 
where Mugabe’s exit was allegedly again discussed (Möllers 2003b). A further 
initiative was a visit by the SADC foreign ministers task force to Harare. In 
May, US special adviser on Africa Walter Kansteiner declared that South Af-
rica, Botswana and Mozambique had agreed that Mugabe needed to be re-
placed (Cape Argus 2002). In June 2003, Mozambican President Chissano 
(quoted in Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique 2003) confirmed in Wash-
ington that quiet diplomacy was “near to a solution”,  claiming that the prob-
lem had been “almost solved.” Quoting unnamed diplomatic sources, Africa 
Confidential (2003) reported that Mbeki had informed Bush at their July meet-
ing of Mugabe’s promise (allegedly made to Mbeki) to step down at the 
ZANU-PF party congress in December 2003. In the course of that year, Mug-
abe himself repeatedly hinted at retirement. However, he neither stepped 
down at the party congress, nor at his 80th birthday soon afterwards, but in-
stead declared his intention of completing his presidential term. The diplo-
matic approach had failed once again.  
Quiet Diplomacy as an expression of South Africa’s foreign policy 
strategy 
The history of South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy has so far been a history of 
failure and broken promises. The unsatisfactory results of quiet diplomacy 
have evoked criticism from two sides. Idealists claim that quiet diplomacy is 
inconsistent with the high moral principles underlying South Africa’s foreign 
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policy; realists criticise that South Africa does not use its hegemonic position 
to protect its interests by cleaning up its backyard. The criticism of quiet di-
plomacy is, after all, an expression of diverging opinions of what South Af-
rica’s foreign policy interests really are, and how these interests may best be 
achieved. I will henceforth argue that quiet diplomacy is not an exception, but 
rather a fitting expression of the complex South African foreign policy 
framework. As it is Mbeki’s perceived best option, the unwavering support 
for quiet diplomacy, in spite of all disappointments, should come as no sur-
prise.   
 South Africa’s foreign policy after 1994 is ultimately grounded in the 
country’s history. The legacy of Apartheid and peaceful transition gave Man-
dela the mandate to reconcile Apartheid victims and perpetrators within the 
country, to reconcile the country with its neighbours and the rest of the world, 
and finally to take the action further and strive for reconciliation in other con-
flicts throughout the world. The foreign policy originating from this task was 
by no means consistent, but bounced between self-interest and universal ide-
alism, African solidarity and partnership with the West. The Mandela period 
began with the idealist proclamation that “human rights will be the light that 
guides our foreign affairs”, and with a commitment to the African continent:  
“South Africa cannot escape its African destiny” (Mandela 1993: 88, 89). The 
policy materialised in solidarity with former ANC supporters, even if this was 
to the dislike of the West, and in outspoken public criticism of deviant behav-
iour by fellow leaders. But the pitfalls of an ethical foreign policy were soon 
experienced in the case of Nigeria, as the ANC’s Pallo Jordan (2001) reviews:   
When, on the eve of a Commonwealth Summit, Sani Abacha ordered 
the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, then President Mandela moved swiftly 
to break off relations and called for tough measures against the Nigerian 
military junta. While Britain, France, the USA, Germany and others ver-
bally applauded his actions, not one of these countries followed South 
Africa’s example. British oil multinationals continued business as usual; 
the USA kept up a vigorous dialogue with Abacha while the US corpo-
rations expanded business contacts; France sought to exploit the tension 
between London and Abudja to its own advantage. South Africa held 
the moral high ground, but in isolation. 
This failure of the idealistic 1995 Nigeria policy, which is often invoked by the 
ANC in the context of Zimbabwe, led to a more careful and more realistic 
foreign policy. The 1998 policy review under Department of Foreign Affairs 
director-general Jackie Selebi reflected this turn by naming wealth creation 
and security as the national foreign policy interests (Vickers 2000: 91). In ac-
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cordance with the national economic interest, Europe was placed higher on 
the agenda than Africa.12 But African solidarity was not surrendered: Thabo 
Mbeki’s African Renaissance, which later translated into the NAI/Nepad 
initiative, masterly blended the need for further integration of (South) Africa 
into the global economy with a call for African solidarity to fight “global 
apartheid” and to work towards a more equitable world. The double ap-
proach of a foreign policy based on two legs, one in Africa and one in the 
West, raises diverging expectations and places South African foreign policy 
on shaky ground. South Africa’s unique position of simultaneously being the 
Western foothold in Africa and Africa’s foothold in the West, makes it a key 
player in the international arena. But as the country is too weak to enforce its 
will on either of the two sides,13 it tries to satisfy both, in order to maintain its 
unique position between the two worlds, which is essential to its national 
interest. South Africa has, in fact, little room for foreign policy manoeuvres. 
The foreign policy arising from this dilemma is ultimately based on pragma-
tism and diplomacy. Instead of throwing its political, economical and military 
weight on one side, South Africa leads multilateral diplomatic initiatives (e.g. 
Nepad, HIPC, G20, Ottawa Convention) and offers its services as honest bro-
ker to conflicting parties (e.g. DRC, Burundi, East Timor) to induce them to 
follow the South African example of peaceful conflict resolution. The Econo-
mist (2003) once called this the Mbeki Doctrine:  
SA cannot impose its will on others, but it can help to deal with instabil-
ity in African countries by offering its resources and its leadership to 
bring rival groups together, and to keep things calm until an election is 
safely held. 
South Africa’s quiet diplomacy must be seen in line with the historical belief 
in the supremacy of negotiated conflict solutions and a balanced diplomacy 
serving the long- term national interest. It is a deeply realist policy.  
 
                                                 
12 The FTA with the EU clearly gained preference over the SACU and SADC-FTA negotia-
tions.  
13 The inability of South Africa to pressurize Western powers is almost self-evident. Within 
Africa, South Africa is often portrayed as the dominant regional power because of its mili-
tary and economic dominance. Schoeman and Alden (2003) argue that South Africa is in fact 
not in a hegemonic position, because it is not ideologically accepted as such. Moeletsi Mbeki 
(2003) argues that South Africa’s inability to act forcefully on African issues is based on the 
government’s misconception  of South Africa as a weak, poor country, which needs the help 
of the West and the solidarity of other weak (African) countries. He criticises this view and 
advocates a more self-confident policy based on the core (economic) interests of the country. 
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Quiet Diplomacy: an expression of realistic South African foreign 
policy goals 
South Africa has abandoned its idealistic foreign policy framework for one 
based on the perceived national interest. In the light of the ongoing violation 
of democratic ideals in that country, the lack of an ethical stance on Zim-
babwe has been severely criticised. But disapproval of quiet diplomacy comes 
also from the realist camp, which sees South Africa’s national interest at 
threat, especially in the areas of welfare, security and African political leader-
ship. In what follows I argue that the Zimbabwe crisis indeed challenges 
South Africa, but that in the light of this challenge, quiet diplomacy is still 
South Africa’s perceived best option.  
The economic challenge  
The Zimbabwe crisis has an immediate impact on bilateral economic activi-
ties. The overall business climate in Zimbabwe is harmful to South African 
companies, the economic slump decreases government and consumer spend-
ing on South African products and services, and the shortage of hard currency 
in Zimbabwe leaves South African companies with outstanding bills. Indi-
rectly, South Africa is affected through a loss of international confidence in 
the stability of the region, which can easily translate into a weaker currency 
(resulting in higher inflation and higher interest rates), a decrease in Foreign 
Direct Investment, and a decline in international tourism arrivals. The accu-
mulated economic costs to South Africa is difficult to estimate. According to a 
report by the Zimbabwe Research Initiative (2003), outstanding payment 
amounted to 465 million Rand in 2002 (among others 80 m owed to Eskom, 60 
m due to Telkom, 75 m for the Reserve Bank). In total, the report puts the 
estimated economic costs to South Africa at Rand 15 billion or 1.3% of GDP.14  
                                                 
14 Other sources name considerably higher numbers. The Daily News (2003) says South 
African companies are owed Rand 140,5 billion. The International Crisis Group (2002: 9) 
estimates the loss to the regional FDI at US $ 36 billion. Both figures seem to be highly over-
estimated, considering that the total export of South Africa to Zimbabwe accounts for only 
about Rand 5-7 billion per year, and total FDI to SADC was never higher than US $ 5.3 bil-
lion per year.  
The report of the Zimbabwe Research Initiative (also known as the Schussler report) claims 
to be based on conservative estimates. However, some of the figures may be doubted. In the 
area of trade, for example, the report calculates South Africa’s losses from a relative decline 
of Zimbabwe as an export destination (1995 basis). But whereas trade with Zimbabwe stag-
nated at a high level from as early as 1995, trade with the rest of the world has shown a 
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Table 2: South African-Zimbabwe trade during the crisis (in SA Rand) 
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
7000000
8000000
Exports to Zimbabwe 5310979 5174196 4859364 5411762 7309455 6511409
Imports from Zimbabwe 1123719 1210862 1299782 1443736 2159755 2656012
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry 2004b. 
www.dti.gov.co.za/econdb/raportt/162Summary$.html   
 
While the crisis undoubtedly impacts negatively on the South African econ-
omy, the policy of quiet diplomacy also offers opportunities. Trade figures 
suggest that while some sectors suffer from the crisis, others directly profit 
from the crisis as their products substitute Zimbabwean products on the local 
and to a lesser extent also on the world market (Table 2). As the Zimbabwe 
trade still generates six billion Rand in trade revenues, the main economic 
interest of South Africa is to prevent a complete collapse of Zimbabwe. Pallo 
Jordan (2001) summarises: “The simple facts of the matter are that should the 
economy of Zimbabwe fall to pieces South Africa’s main trading partner on 
the African continent would go down the tubes.” In addition to the direct 
losses, a breakdown of Zimbabwe would adversely affect South Africa’s trade 
with the rest of the continent, which is rapidly growing. The geographical fact 
that Beitbridge is South Africa’s gateway to the continent cannot be ignored 
by politics.  
 Apart from the immediate concern of upholding the current business 
partnership with Zimbabwe, quiet diplomacy paves the way for further prof-
its in the future. Once the crisis is over, South Africa will have lost its main 
economic competitor in the region. The economic penetration of Zimbabwe 
                                                                                                               
tremendous increase since then. This suggests that the rapid decline in Zimbabwe’s relative 
market share was probably not exclusively due to the country’s internal crisis. Tourism 
arrivals and the Rand have also been on the rise again over the past two years. Thus, looking 
at current data, the report probably paints too bleak a picture.  
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by South African business had started long before the crisis, but it will accel-
erate once the crisis is over. The indebtedness of Zimbabwean companies to 
South African counterparts, and the need for investment after the crisis, will 
leave Zimbabwe no option but to sell their economy southwards. A protocol 
on investment protection is currently being negotiated. Wilfred Mhanda 
(2002: 157) of the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform concludes: “One cannot help 
but conclude that it is in South Africa’s economic interests to allow Mugabe to 
continue on his self-destructive path.” And Dale McKinley (2003) sees sub-
imperialistic interests of the “emerging black and traditional (white) bour-
geoisie” as the driving force behind quiet diplomacy. Thus, despite Mbeki’s 
continuing pledge that “we will never treat Zimbabwe as the tenth province 
of South Africa” (Mbeki 2003), economically this will be the long-term effect 
of the non-intervention policy.  
The security challenge    
In the field of security, the major threat of the Zimbabwe crisis currently 
stems from the influx of refugees. An estimated 25 000 to 30 000 cross the 
Limpopo every month (Sunday Times 2003). The illegal immigrants are not 
only a threat to the upper class, who fear for their lives and jewels, but even 
more so to the poor majority. As cheap labourers in the informal market, the 
Zimbabwean competitors pose a threat in the daily fight for survival. The 
constant battle of police and border forces against illegal immigration is 
probably the most directly felt effect of the crisis. But while the problem is 
already serious, it could become much worse once the authoritarian state 
turns into a failing state. As a direct neighbour, South Africa fears nothing 
more than the outbreak of an open civil war on its northern border.. Com-
pared to the costs of a complete collapse of Zimbabwe, with the chance of 
mass emigration of refugees and an eventual need for military intervention, 
the current security problems seem to be rather controllable. The prime goal 
of South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy is therefore to avoid a further worsening 
of the situation. Mediation not escalation is the concrete outflow of this ap-
proach.  
The leadership challenge   
The third and probably most controversial argument that is brought forward 
against quiet diplomacy, is the alleged threat it poses to South Africa’s inter-
national status and its ambition for regional and continental leadership, and 
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especially its presumed effects on the flagship projects of SADC, AU, and 
Nepad. At this point realists, who advocate a proactive enforcement of South 
Africa’s position on the continent from an interest-based point of view, meet 
with idealists, who advocate interference from a human-rights standpoint.  
Admittedly, SADC and Nepad - as organisations or projects based on democ-
ratic principles and on the rule of law - have lost credibility for allegedly fail-
ing the Zimbabwe litmus test. President Mbeki, the advocate of an African 
Renaissance, has been challenged for being a weak leader and for not stand-
ing firm on his democratic principles. In some cases (such as the SADC peace-
keeping training centre in Harare) regional projects even had to close down 
because of the crisis.15 Besides the direct consequences, the crisis has also rein-
forced old rifts within SADC and the Commonwealth. Especially the latter 
faced a fundamental crisis over the Zimbabwe issue, which became most 
visible in the diplomatic confrontation surrounding the Abuja Summit in 
2003.    
 Undoubtedly, Mbeki had to pay a diplomatic price for his deviant 
behaviour in the West and at home. But at the end of the day, neither his re-
election as president (the ANC won the 2004 election with an unprecedented 
69,7 %) nor his AU/Nepad project was damaged beyond repair. However, if 
Mbeki had joined the Western train of bullying Mugabe out of office, his Ren-
aissance dreams might have found an abrupt ending. South Africa is often 
portrayed as the unchallenged regional and continental leader, because of its 
political and military dominance. According to Schoeman and Alden (2003: 
16/17), this is in fact a misconception, because even after 10 years of majority 
rule, South Africa is not regarded as an equal  by fellow African countries and 
their leaders: 
[R]eal power comes not so much from tangible resources, as from the 
fact that the hegemon’s ideology is acceptable and unquestioned and 
forms a “consensual order” that determines behaviour in its sphere of 
influence. ... Unless the “hegemon” is accepted as such ... it is doubtful 
that its strategies and tactics of achieving its goals will be successful. 
This lack of regional acceptance does not only explain the failure of Mbeki’s 
quiet diplomacy – Mugabe’s constant ignorance of Mbeki’s advice –, but the 
Zimbabwe crisis also reinforces the urge to work towards greater acceptance 
and political influence in the region. Because South Africa is, due to its domi-
nant position and good relations with the West, widely perceived as  “the 
                                                 
15 The SADC peace-keeping training centre was mainly funded by Denmark. After the 
suspension of development aid, the centre had to close down, even though it was mainly a 
regional institution.  
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colonizer from the South” or ”the lackey of the West”, the policy towards the 
continent must be handled with care, as John Stremlau (2003) argues:  
If South Africa wants to lead a voluntary regional order conducive to its 
own best interests, demonstrating self-restraint in the use of superior 
power will be necessary to reassure weaker states that they will be nei-
ther dominated nor ignored. Signs of self-restraint become critical to de-
veloping a durable and mutually acceptable regional order.... Independ-
ent action against Zimbabwe would have been seen by others as a ... 
threat. 
If regional hegemony was an end in itself, South Africa could have easily 
surrendered other aims and objectives in the region to take a tougher stance 
on Zimbabwe. However, during the Zimbabwe crisis, major regional water-
shed decisions were being taken, on which South Africa could not compro-
mise. In Angola and the DRC, peace processes were being negotiated. Espe-
cially in the case of the DRC, Zimbabwe’s agreement to withdraw its forces 
was of key importance. An end to the civil war in both countries is not only a 
political success for South Africa, but even more a chance for the South Afri-
can economy, which stands to benefit greatly from a peace agreement. In the 
field of regional integration, the member states have eventually agreed to a 
major SADC reform after years of stalemate, and Zimbabwe was persuaded 
to give up its blockage of the SADC security organ. On the continental level, 
AU and NEPAD were successfully introduced. The framing of Mbeki’s flag-
ship programs were especially challenged by Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi, whose 
ambitions to be the leader of the continent are by no means limited to north-
ern Africa, but extend all the way down to the Limpopo. In the ageing Mug-
abe he found awilling ally for his vision of an anti-Western, authoritarian 
Africa - right on the doorstep of his continental rival, Thabo Mbeki. He not 
only provided US $1 million for Mugabe’s 2002 election campaign, but also 
forged a US $ 360 million oil deal with the embattled Mugabe regime.16 South 
Africa’s economic and diplomatic assistance to Mugabe must also be under-
stood as an effort to contain Gaddafi’s influence and to secure regional and 
continental support for South Africa’s position. While Mbeki has won the first 
round of getting his Renaissance project started, he still needs diplomatic 
backing from the rest of the continent to take his efforts further. The AU’s 
peer review mechanism is in its starting phase, the battle of which African 
country will host the AU’s parliament and the 2010 soccer world cup is on, 
and within the UN and WTO, South Africa needs the unanimous support of 
                                                 
16 According to Morais and Naidu (2003), Libya received land and shares in several Zim-
babwean companies in return.  
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fellow African countries to back up its position as leader of the global South. 
Contradictory as it might seem at first glance, Mbeki appears to be convinced 
that in order to achieve his long-term regional, continental and global goals of 
an African Renaissance, he has to forge a provisional compromise with the 
devil in his backyard.      
Conclusion 
Zimbabwe’s self-destructive turn from democracy to dictatorship and chaos 
poses a major challenge to South Africa. This article has shown that, despite 
its lack of success in bringing a solution to the crisis, South Africa’s policy of 
quiet diplomacy is by no means irrational. It is not only in line with the coun-
try’s overall foreign policy, but it is furthermore perceived by the South Afri-
can government as the policy option that best reflects the national interest. 
South Africa could well follow the European example of diplomatic confron-
tation and smart sanctions. A policy based on democratic principles would 
win Mbeki friends at home and abroad. However, by breaking ties with Mug-
abe, South Africa would not only surrender its position as a mediator between 
the parties, but it would also ultimately loose its further influence on the cri-
sis. The failure of the EU’s “loud diplomacy” provides a negative example of 
a major power restricting its freedom to act by occupying the moral high 
ground and painting itself into a corner. In addition, the shockwaves that 
such a policy change would send around the African continent might do 
South Africa’s leadership ambitions more harm than good. Even more con-
troversial than a tough diplomatic stance is the option of economic sanctions 
or a military intervention. Looking at the power relations, it is clear that South 
Africa could drive Mugabe to the edge within weeks. But while an externally 
stimulated escalation brings the chance of rapid solution, it could as well 
bring the smouldering conflict to an explosion. Judging by Mugabe’s behav-
iour over the past few years, it is by no means guaranteed that he would sur-
render to South African pressure. It is equally possible that he would fight to 
the bitter end.  
 As Europe is hardly affected by the consequences of the crisis, it can 
well afford to follow an idealistic foreign policy of breaking ties with a failed 
democracy. South Africa does not have that option. The ANC’s Zimbabwe 
expert Victor Mditshwa (quoted in IRIN 2004) argues that, „[a]mong the 
SADC countries, we are the closest neighbour – anything that happens to 
Zimbabwe affects us“. Therefore South Africa has decided to keep the Zim-
babwe conflict boiling on a low flame, rather than provoking an explosion 
with uncertain consequences. The South African position has not prevented 
the collapse of Zimbabwe. However, through the strategy of a slow and “con-
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trolled” collapse, the human and economic costs of the crisis have so far 
largely been kept within the borders of Zimbabwe. The prolonging of Zim-
babwe’s suffering as a result of South Africa’s risk minimisation strategy may 
be justly contested as unethical and irresponsible towards the people of Zim-
babwe. However, looking at other cases of state crisis in Africa, where a rapid 
regime collapse led to destabilisation far beyond the borders of the afflicted 
country, the current South African policy may well be the most rational op-
tion. 
 Considering what is at stake for South Africa in Zimbabwe, a depar-
ture from quiet diplomacy seems unlikely in the near future. Judging from 
recent history, Mbeki will only embark on such a far-reaching and risky pol-
icy change, once the situation in Zimbabwe becomes unbearable for South 
Africa. The ANC has made it clear that external powers will play no role in 
this decision: “There is no way we are going to change our approach because 
we believe it is the correct one ... We won’t be dictated to because we know 
what we are doing and we have always known what we are doing” (Myo-
kayaka-Manzini quoted in Mail and Guardian 2001). European politicians 
would therefore be well advised to accept the South African standpoint in-
stead of trying to change what they cannot change. Otherwise the South Afri-
can - European relations could be the next victim of the Zimbabwe crisis.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die südafrikanische Politik der stillen Diplomatie gegenüber Mugabe stößt in 
Südafrika und im Westen gleichermaßen auf heftige Kritik. Da Südafrika bei der 
Lösung des Simbabwekonflikts allgemein eine Schlüsselrolle zugeschrieben wird, 
mehren sich die Stimmen, die eine Kehrtwende in Mbekis Simbabwepolitik for-
dern. Der Artikel untersucht die Gründe für die südafrikanische Politik der stillen 
Diplomatie. Er widerspricht dabei der landläufigen Meinung, dass die stille Dip-
lomatie auf alte ideologische Verbundenheit zurückführend ist. Statt einer Aus-
nahmeerscheinung wird sie vielmehr als der Tradition und den allgemeinen Zie-
len der südafrikanischen Außenpolitik entsprechend dargestellt. Obwohl die stille 
Diplomatie die Krise bislang nicht zu lösen vermochte, wird sie dennoch als die 
für Südafrika beste Option angesehen, da sie das potentielle Risiko einer noch 
tieferen Krise vermindert. Angesichts dieser Sichtweise müssen externe Aufforde-
rungen an Mbeki, seine Politik zu ändern, ungehört verhallen. 
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Résumé  
 
La politique sud-africaine de la diplomatie discrète envers Mugabe fait l’objet 
d’une critique virulente en Afrique du Sud comme à l’Ouest. Etant donné qu’il est 
attribué à l’Afrique du Sud un rôle clé dans la résolution du conflit zimbabwéen, 
les voix qui exigent un changement radical de la politique zimbabwéenne de 
Mbeki se multiplient. L’article recherche les raisons de la diplomatie discrète me-
née par l’Afrique du Sud et se met en porte-à-faux de l’opinion courante selon 
laquelle la diplomatie discrète résulterait des anciens liens idéologiques et revêti-
rait un caractère exceptionnel. Il est montré qu’elle relève plutôt de la tradition et 
des objectifs généraux de la politique étrangère sud-africaine. Bien qu’elle n’ait 
jusqu’à présent pas apporté de solution à la crise, la politique discrète est considé-
rée comme la meilleure option pour l’Afrique du Sud puisqu’elle minimise les 
risques d’une crise encore plus profonde. Ainsi, tous les appels de l’extérieur de-
mandant à Mbeki de changer sa politique sont vains. 
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